INTRODUCTION Zehra
Nur Düz
Even
though Kemalism and Zionism officialy decleares that all citizens from
different ethnic, religious and sectarian groups had equal rights in their
states and they have an democratic, secular, civic, territorial, non-ethnic and
non-religious understanding of nationalism; they made a religious and ethnic
definitions of Jewish and Turkish identitiy and in both cases we can observe
the primacy of religion over ethnicity. So my research question is that despite
their emphasis on secularism and non-ethnic nationalism; why Kemalism and
Zionism still identified Islam and Judaism as the most important factors for
access to their countries?
My
main aim is to explain the contradictions of religious origins and secular nation-building
processes in Turkey and Israel. So, in this study I also seek answers to sub
-question of ‘how these countries cope with this contradiction?‘’. I also try to answer the other sub questions
of ‘’Is Israel a secular state or a Jewish state?’’, ‘’
Is Turkey a secular state or a Muslim
state?’’.
The
main thesis of this research is that the modern nationalist
ideology did not extinguish religious envision in these countries, rather it
maintained religion by transforming it.
In both countries secularization processes made radical changes in the meaning
of religion. Through secularization processes the religious faith was
excluded from the public domain.
However
Kemalist and Zionist ideologies did not think Islam and Judaism only as a
faith. Religion can serve also as a culture, as a identity and even as a
ideology. As a result of this understanding the faith dimension of the religion
was marginalized and excluded from the society. However ‘nominal’ Islam and
Judaism as a culture and identitiy maintained its central position in the
society. Kemalism and Zionism accepted nominal Islam and Judaism as important
determinants of Turkishness and Jewishness. So we can not define Kemalist and
Zionis regimes as totally anti-religious. What is aimed with the secularization
process was creating of more secular, modern and national religions. We can
define these two states as ’ secular
states in religious cohabitation.’’
KEMALISM
There
is a disagreement among scholars to explain how Turkish nationhood is defined
after the establishment of Republic. 1st
view: The classical view describes Republic’s understanding of nationalism
as civic, territorial and non-ethnic in parallel with official
definition which is in the constitution and other official documents. To
support this argument they show the Mustafa Kemal’s motto of ‘’Happy is he who
calls himself a Turk’’. According to this understanding, all people who live in
Turkey have the right to call himself a ‘’Turk’’.
From
this point of view they interpret Kemaslist consideration of citizenship as
more inclusive than Ottoman Empire. According to this view, with the
establishment of Turkish republic a new modern society was created and in this
society all citizens from different ethnic, religious and sectarian groups had
equal rights. They especially emphasize the important role which is played by
the principle of secularism in removing the religiously defined millets, and gathering all citizens
under the modern and secular nation. (Aktürk, 2009, p.894-896)
2nd view: As
against this view; critical scholars evaluates Republic’s understanding of
Turkish nationhood as ethnic and racial with reference to official policies of
the state. These scholars argue that the ethnic identity started to play an
important role for the definition of nationhood after the transition from
Empire to Republic. Some others, in a different way, evaluate this ethnic base
approach as a continuation. They argues that the Republic identified the Turks
with reference to the Ottoman Muslim Millet and non-Turks with reference to the
Ottoman Christians. Because both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Republic the
language of the state was Turkish. Also, the ethnic minorities, even Muslim
ones like Arabs, who maintain and defend their ethnic and linguistic identities
were exluded from this Anatolian-Rumelian millet.
They show the assimilation of different ethnic Muslim groups during Republican
era as an evidence to their argument. In other words they concentrate their
focuses on the Turkification policies of the Republic rather than
Muslimification. The exclusion of different ethnic Muslim minorities from the
borders of ‘’Turkishness’’ was the main aim of these Turkification policies. (Karpat,
2007, p.325)
3rd view: As
opposed to both of these positions there are some scholars who suggests that
the Republic’s nationalism was neither civic nor mono-ethnic. Instead, with
reference to official state policies, they argues that the definition of
Turkish nationhood was mono-religious and anti-ethnic which is totally against
the official secularism and democracy principle. In other words; the borders of
Turkish nationhood was determined by religion not ethnicity. The
main reason for this fact is that the modern Turkish millet(nation) shows a remerkable
permanency with the legacy of the Ottoman millet
system. (Aktürk, 2009, p.908)
We
can varify this argument by analysing the state’s immigration policies,
regulations on citizenship, public employment and minority policies. The 1924
exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece is one of the most remerkable
evidence that shows the priority of religion to ethnicity. With this exchange
almost all Anatolian Christians whose native language was Turkish and define
themselves to be Turkish were deported to Greece. On the other hand Creatan
Muslims who speaks Greek were deported to Turkey. Turkey’s support for the
immigration of Balkan Muslims from different ethnicities to Turkey, and on the
other hand Turkey’s rejection of the immigration of Orthodox Gagauz Turks to
Turkey are also strong evidences. The ethnic Jewish Sabbatean community’s
immigration to Turkey can also be interpreted in the same way.
The
state wanted to assimilate these different Muslim ethnic minorites, both immigrants and natives like
Kurds, Arabs, Lazes and Georgians, into the culture of the Turkish speaking
majority. The assimilation of natives were much more difficult than immigrants for
the state and still it is.
We
can categorize discrimination against non-Muslims like Jews, Greeks and
Armenians, the three official minorities and three of the historic Ottoman
millets, into two groups: official and societal discrimination. The official
discrimination can also be subcategorized into two groups: instances of discrimination and systematic
discrimination. (Aktürk, 2009, p.897)
The
Thracian events of 1934, discrimination against non-Muslim individuals and the
events of antisemitism during 1920s and 1930s can be given as examples to the instances of discrimination. However,
the Wealth Tax of 1940 and the attacks of 5-6 September 1955 can be count as
the most important ones.
The
lack of employment opportunities in bureaucracy, in military and the lack of
representation in the Turkish Parliament shows clearly the systemic discrimination against non-Muslims. Also we see the
official registration of these groups as Jewish, Greek Orthodox etc.; which is
not the case for Muslim citizens. This example shows strikingly how the
population is classified according to religious identities.
However, the mono-religious definition of
Turkish Nationhood and Turkish state’s discriminatation in favor of Sunni
Orthodox Islam contradict with Republic’s secularizing reforms. These reforms
started with the abolishment of the caliphate on November 2, 1924. Changing the
Muslim sabbath, Friday into Sunday, the abolishment of the Ministry for Islamic
Law and pious foundations, shutting down of religious seminaries, giving the religious
high schools to the control of Ministry of Education, closing of Sufi dervish
lodges, declaration of the fez illegal and forcing all men to wear
western-style hats, abondining the lunar calendar and clock and switching to
the Gregorian calendar and solar clock, TBMM’s approving of a secular civil
code, the annulling of the Shariat courts, declaring Islamic law invalid,
eliminating the declaration of Islam as Turkey’s state religion from
constitution, and lastly dropping the Arabic alphabet and switching over to
Latin alphabet were the reforms which were introduced during 1920s.( Çagaptay,
2006, p.14)
Secularization
process affected the Kemalist understanding of nationalism. Until the mid way
of 1920s the Islam was seen as the main consolidative factor among Muslims.
Islam was important for Kemalism not only as a main paramater of Turkish
nationhood. They recognized Islam also as a key for access to their country.
The state functionalized Islam as a homogenizing, mobilizer and integrative tool
to protect the integrity of the country. Because religions contributes to a
sense of national unity and national identity. Religions are thought as a very
strong common bond among the citizens of nation.
For example; Islamic identity played an important role during the National
Struggle and Muslims were mobilized against unbelievers. The leadership
mobilized the Anatolian Turkish Muslims by emphasizing their common religion.
However
in parallel with secularizing reforms the significance of Islam for Kemalism’s
notion of Turkishness has decreased. Instead Kemalism devoloped a varied definition
of nation. They started to give new references to the Turkish territory,
language, to a shared past, shared interests, feelings and ideas, and also to ‘the
desire to live together’. ( Çagaptay, 2006, p.14)
Through
secularization process the Islamic faith was excluded from the public domain.
However Kemalist ideology did not think Islam only as a faith. Islam can serve
also as a culture, as a identity and even as a ideology for the Muslims. As a
result of the secularization process; the faith dimension of the religion was
marginalized and excluded from the society. However ‘nominal’ Islam as a
culture and identitiy maintained its central position in the society. Kemalism
accepted nominal Islam, cultural and unifiying, as an important determinant of
Turkishness.
With
reference to the discriminations against non-Muslims which I have mentioned
above we can suggest that ‘’despite its
commitment to secularism as well as territorial- voluntaristic-linguistic forms
of citizenship, Kemalist nationalism was still molded by Islam.’’(
Çagaptay, 2006, p.15) So we can not define Kemalist regime as totally
anti-religious. What is aimed with the secularization process was creating a
more secular, modern and national Islam.
ZIONISM
In
1947, after the Nazi massacre, many thousands of Jewish persons left homeless.
The oppressions and discriminations against Jews strengthened their claim for
sovereignty and self determination and improved their common identity. This
situation posed a serious problem for the Western countries. To solve this
Jewish problem establishment of a ‘Jewish’ state besides an Arab state in the
‘Eretz Israel’ was decided by the 1947 UN General Assembly resolution. This
resolution guarenteed civil rights for minorities in these two new states.
However
the definition of the term ‘Jew’ for the new state stayed as a identity problem
for a long time for the Zionist elite. Because there was a contradiction
between the democratic provisions and demands of UN and Zionist vision of
establishment of an Jewish state. The articles of the 1948 Decleration of the
Establishment of The State of Israel shows this contradiction clearly. On the
one part; it describes an inclusive nationalism that provides equal social and
political rights for all of its citizens from different ethnic and religious
origins. On the other part; it recognizes ‘’the
right of the Jewish people in its own country through the founding of a
‘Jewish’ state.’’(Sand, 2009, 280-282)
With
this decleration both Jews and non-Jews are defined as Israelis. However the
state did not want to accept the fact that state belongs to its all citizens
without noticing their religious and ehnic differences. They believed that the
state had been founded only for the Jewish people. In other words it had an
ethno- religious nationalist feature in nature. At this point we need to ask the
questions of ‘’what is the definition of the Jewish ethnos?’’ and ‘’who stays
within the borders of this new Jewish state and who are excluded?’’.
To
answer this question we need to first analyse the relationship between religion
and nationalism in the context of Israel. In the Israel there were a main conflict
between religious and secular groups. On the one hand; rabbinical wing and its
theocratic tradition was always an important obstacle for Jewish nationalism. On
the other hand; to realize the purposes of Zionism, the state exploited the
Jewish religion many times. Despite this contradiction between religion and
nationalism; religion played a complementary role for nationalism. Nationalism
worked in cooperation with religion to realize its mission. So we can define Israel as ‘’a secular state in religious cohabitation.’’(Sand, 2009, 284)
Rather
than a secular definition; the state had to make a religious definition of
Jewish identitiy. Even though the state tried to build a secular Israeli
culture; this culture could not unite Israelis who came from different parts of
the world and who are culturally very different from each other. Even though
this new secular culture obtained its some specialities from Jewish sources it also refused this rabbinical tradition. Because of
this new culture’s incompatibility with Jewish religious cultures, the Jews
could not embrace it. From this point of view; we can suggest that
the old religious culture sustains its positon as the primary consolidative and
integrative ground for international Jewry. The dream of the creating a secular
Jewish culture which embrace all the Jews in the world has never been realized.
(Sand, 2009, 285)
We
should also analyse the modern nationalism’s transformative effect on religion.
The modern nationalist ideology did not
extinguish religious envision, rather it maintained religion by transforming it. Politicians have used religion as
a tool to reach their ethnocentric nationalistic purposes. Nationalism receives
many of its imaginations and symbols from the religious sources. In short, Zionist
ideology forms an idiosyncratic combination between ethnocentric nationalism
and traditional religion.
Such kind of an nationalism revolutionized the meaning of
religion. Religion is not be understood as a personal belief anymore rather it
is transformed into an indicator and symbol of Jews’ collective identity and
dividedness. Religion gained a new unholy function: it turned into an ethnic feature
that is natural, organic, unchangeable rather than respective liability and an
option. Liah Greenfeld describes such kind of an understanding of religion as a reflection of race. (Sand,
2009, 286)
With
reference to the explanations above now we can give answers to the questions of
’what is the definition of the Jewish ethnos?’’ and ‘’who stays within the
borders of this new Jewish state and who are excluded?’’Determining the limits
and borders of its national identity was a very serious problem for Israel. A lot of scientific efforts which was spent to
describe who was a Jew and who was a gentile became unsuccessful.
To solve this identity problem in the
beginning the state made an democratic and inclusive definition that is based
on consent. The 1950 Law of Return gave every Jew who was exposed to
discrimination the right to migrate to Israel as long as he/she does not pose
any threat to the healt or the security of the state. However in 1958 the state
started to define the ‘Jew’ relying on the mother’s identity. Finally; the
religion laid down as a precondition to nationality. Halakhic doctrines became
the primary condition for ethnocentric Zionism.
In
1970, an amendment was made to the Law of Return and the people of Israel is
defined very clearly. To become a Jew, one should have been has a Jewish mother
and should have been become Jewish. (Sand, 2009, 286-292)In short, finally a
connection between religion and
nationalism was established legally. On the other hand; Israel moved totally
away from a liberal democracy. So, today it is impossible to mention about an
Israeli nation. Instead we can talk about a Jewish nation. With reference to
its current occupation and settlement policies; it seems still very difficult
to talk about an Israeli identity.
COMPARISION:
During my article I have tried to explain the
difficulties that Kemalism and Zionism face for the definition of nationhood.
Both of them officialy decleares that all citizens from different ethnic,
religious and sectarian groups had equal rights in their states. In other words
they claim that they have an democratic, secular, civic, territorial, non-ethnic
and non-religious understanding of nationalism.
However
as I explained above this is not the reality. Rather than a secular and
democratic definition; these state made a religious and ethnic definitions of
Jewish and Turkish identitiy and in both cases we can observe the primacy of
religion over ethnicity. We can varify this argument by analysing these two
states’ immigration policies, regulations on citizenship and minority policies.
While Turkey discriminated against non-Muslims like Jews, Greeks and Armenians;
Israel discriminated against gentiles.
The
comparison of Turkey and Israel in terms of the
contradiction of religious origins(Islamic and rabbinical heritage) and secular
nation-building process is also possible. The ethnic- religious definition
of their nationhood and these states’ discriminatation in favor of Sunni
Orthodox Islam and Judaism contradict with these states’ secularizing reforms.
Even though these new secular cultures obtained their some specialities from
religious sources their efforts to build secular cultures became unsuccessful. Even
though this new secular culture obtained its some specialities from Jewish and
Islamic sources, ironically they also refused these religious traditions. Because
of these new culture’s incompatibility with Jewish and Islamic cultures, the
Jews could not embrace it. From this point of view; we can suggest that the old
religious culture sustains its positon as the primary consolidative and
integrative ground for both states.
In
both countries despite the contradiction between religion and nationalism;
religion played a complementary role for nationalism. Nationalism worked in
cooperation with religion to help to realize its mission. So we can define these states as ‘’ secular states in religious cohabitation.’’
The
modern nationalism’s transformative effect on religion was also common for
these two states. The modern nationalist
ideology did not extinguish religious envision in these countries, rather it
maintained religion by transforming it.
Politicians have used religion as a tool to reach their ethnocentric
nationalistic purposes by receiving many of their nationalistic imaginations
and symbols from the religious sources.
In both countries secularization processes made radical
changes in the meaning of religion. Through secularization
processes the religious faith was excluded from the public domain. However
Kemalist and Zionist ideologies did not think Islam and Judaism only as a
faith. Religions can serve also as a culture, as a identity and even as a ideology.
As a result of this understanding the faith dimension of the religion was
marginalized and excluded from the society.
However ‘nominal’ Islam and Judaism as a
culture and identitiy maintained its central position in the society. Kemalism
and Zionism accepted nominal Islam and Judaism as important determinants of
Turkishness and Jewishness. So we can not define Kemalist and Zionis regimes as
totally anti-religious. What is aimed with the secularization process was
creating of more secular, modern and national religions.
THEORETICAL
EXPLANATION
There
is a common understanding that the religion and nationalism are contradictory
terms. People generally think that nationalism, which is a secular phenomena by
its nature, arised with the decline of religion. According to this approach
nationalist politics based on claims made in the name of the nation remain
distinct from forms of religious politics that seek to transfrom public life
not in the name of the nation, but in the name of god. As I will explain below;
other approaches states that political actors may make claims both in the name
of the nation and in the name of God.
This
modernisationist notion which sees nationalism as noticeably a secular fact by
was been criticised by some scholars. They are critisizing these arguments by covering
many linkages between religion and nationalism. The other approaches which I
will mention below does not see religion and nationalism as completely seperate
terms and they try to explore the several connections and closeness between
religion and nationalism. ( Brubaker,
2012, p.1-3 , 15-17)To analyse the relationship of religion and nationalism in
the context of Turkey and Israel these other approaches are useful.
*
As Anthony Smith argues; religious
motives, narratives and symbols may be transfering into the political area and
may be used to constitute nationalist arguments.( Brubaker, 2012, 5-8) In
other words; religion can support to the improvement of nationalism through the
political adoption of religious symbols and narratives. This was the case both
in Turkey and Israel as I explained above.
*Nationalist
theses are also sometimes generated correspondingly with religious theses. The ‘’myth of ethnic election’’ is given as
an example to this situation by Smith. Nationalism may undertake a religious
characteristic, by accepting some of the shapes and functions of religion.
Similarly, religion can comply with the arguments of nation-state and religious
leaders can use a nationalist language. ( Brubaker, 2012, 5-8) The motif of
‘chosen people’ in the Israel case, while Turkish History thesis and Sun
Language Theory may be the well-directed examples for this argument.
*Also in some cases religion becomes deeply
imbricated or intertwined with nationalism and it provides myths and metaphors to the nation.
Religious sources supports nationalism to explain the questions of ‘’who are
we’’ and ‘what is special about us’’. Sometimes religious discourses become
very useful to describe the specific feature, mission or fate of a nation. Also
the ‘nationalization’or ‘politicisation’ of religion in its organizational and
practical as well as discursive aspects promotes to the symbiosis of religious
and national traditions. ( Brubaker, 2012, 8-12)
*In some ways religion helps explain nationalism’s origin,
its power or its distinctive character. Benedict
Anderson evaluates ‘nation’ as the continuation of ‘religious community’. (Anderson, 2006, 9-37) Religion has
played an important role in formation of nationalism as an ideology. Hobsbawm
states that religion can be used as the proto-nationalism or as the antecedent
of nationalism. Because during nation building processes it can be used as a
tool to unite people together and to mobilize them. (Hobsbawm,1993, 89) The
continuing legacy of the Ottoman millet system in the case of Turkey and the turning of Judaism from
a religion into a nation can be given as examples to this explanation.
* Nationalism and nation building processes has determined the modern and social
formation of religion. During nation building processes religion has been
ideologised and religion transformed into a world view and an ideology. Nationalist ideology does not extinguish
religious envision, rather nationalism maintains religion by transforming and nationalizing it. We can define this situation as ‘the
secularization of the sacred’.
*Some scholars like Elias defines nationalism as a ‘secular belief system’. Nationalism with its own religious rituals,
myths, symbols, its speculative theology or mythology, pilgrimages, holy days,
patriotic heroes, sacred places and its supreme sacrifice is defined as a religion by
Calton Hayes.(Hayes, 1995) Anthony Smith also defines nationalism as ‘the new
religion of the people’.(Smith, 2003) We can interpret this as the religious
matrix of the category of the secular itself.
*In his book Tanıl Bora states that we should not think
nationalism only as a modernization ideology. Because even though nationalism
shares some common senses with modernity; it also shows very important
similarities with religion. Elias defines nationalism as ‘the birth of a new
mystic’ and as a ‘new sense of community’ that substitutes the sense of
religious community. (Bora, 2009, 97-104)Nationalism meets the need of
spirituality by sacralizing the nation. From this point of view. Bora evaluates
nationalism and religion together as reactions against modernity and
universalist - secular asimilation.
In his books Bora explains how religion and nationalism are
combined. He mentions about a paradox between these two. (Bora, 2009, 99-104)
Even though religion contributes to nationalism in many ways, it impedes
nationalism’s modernization mission. In a historical context where these
ideologies are rival to each other, especially during nation building
processes, this paradox constitute major problems. ‘Nationalizing religion’ and
‘religionizing nationalism’ are the ideal typical solutions to this paradox.
Through these ways religion and nationalism are combined.
CONCLUSION
I
chose these two countries to analyse this contradiction. Because both of them
were established as secular and ethno-nationalist states and in both states the
nationalism contradict with both religion and national and religious
minorities. In addition to this; when we compare the nation-building processes
of Israel and Turkey, we see also some other historical and cultural
similarities. For example; both of them were founded as a result of war and
through mass immigrations and exiles. Also in both of them the minorities were
exposed to human rights abuses. Both
Zionism and Kemalism convert their religions into the special characteristic of
their nation. They changed religious communities into national communities and turned religion into ethnicity.
- Soner
Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism and
Nationalism in Modern Turkey Who is a Turk? (London & New York:
Routledge, 2006), pp. 102-162.
-Kemal H.
Karpat, Review of Islam,
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey Who is a Turk?, International
Journal of Middle East Studies. 39(2):324-326; Cambridge
University Press, 2007. Language: English
-Aktürk, Şener, Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious
and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood, Middle Eastern Studies.
45(6):893-909, 2009
-Kolsky, Thomas,
Jews Against Zionism, Temple University Press, 1992
-Mesut Yeğen, “Turkish Nationhood: Civic and Ancestral
and Cultural”, Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics, 23:3, 2017, pp. 318-339.
-Seth J. Frantzman, Terra Incognıta: The Turkısh Roots Of Israel’s
Polıtıcs: Insıde The Deep State, The Jeruselam Post,
September 4, 2016
-Brubaker,
Rogers, 2012 Religionand Nationalism: FourApproaches, Nations and
Nationalism,18(1) ,2-20
-Anderson,
Benedict, 2006, Imagined Communities, Verso,
-Hobsbawm,
E.J. 1993,Milletler ve Milliyetçilik, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları,
-Hayes, Carlton J.H.,1994 Milliyetçilk: Bir
Din, İstanbul: İzi
-Smith,
A.D., 2003. Chosen Peoples, Oxford: Oxford University Press
-Bora,
Tanıl, 2009, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilk, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık,İstanbul:
Birikim Yayınları
-Bora,
Tanıl, 2017, Cereyanlar;Türkiye’de Siyasi İdeolojiler , İstanbul: İletişim
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