INTRODUCTION
From
the beginning of AK Party rule MHP was a part of the opposition, but all of a sudden there
was a secret coalition. This came as an astonishment especially for younger generations. Rather then actual political motives, causes and calculations
behind this alignment; with my research I aim to analyse ‘’what lies within the ideological roots of
this alignment?’’
In
today’s Turkey the frontiers among nationalist and Islamist and conservative
positions became heavily indistinct and the transitions between them heavily
increased. This new trend in political ideology directed
me to question the relationship between Islamism and nationalism in Turkey and motived
me to analyze the common roots of Turkish nationalism with Islamic thought. So,
during my research I will try to explain how
Islamism and nationalism can come and keep together on the theoric and on the
political level.
My
main argument is that to interpret the current Ak Party – MHP alliance in the
ideological level; rather than thinking
nationalism, conservatism and Islamism as different and totally contested
political and ideological positions; we should think them as deeply
imbricated and intertwined with each other. Because throughout history these two positions showed multiple
connections, affinities and transitivities.
In
the first part of my research I will explain someways of analysing the
relationship between religion and nationalism with referance to some theorists.
In the second part I will mention about the historical background and I will explain
the roots of this new trend in the political
ideology and in the Turkish politcal life.
THEORETICAL
EXPLANATION
Religion
and nationalism are mainly thought as contested terms and the relationship
between them as contrary. It is a commonly shared idea that nationalism, which
is a secular phenomena by its nature, arised from the decline of religion. In
other words it is assumed that religion was replaced by nationalism. According
to this approach nationalist politics based on claims made in the name of the
nation remain distinct from forms of religious politics that seek to transfrom
public life not in the name of the nation, but in the name of god. As I will
explain below; other approaches states that political actors may make claims
both in the name of the nation and in the name of God.
The
understanding of nationalism as a distinctively secular phenomenon by
long-dominant modernisationist theorists(ex. Deutsch, Gellner, Breuilly,
Hechter and Anderson) was been criticised by some scholars. They have
challenged the notion that modernity requires the privitization of religion.
They are critisizing modernisationist arguments by concealing some connections
between religion and nationalism. The other approaches which I will mention
below does not see religion and nationalism as completely seperate terms and
they try to explore the multiple connections and affinities between religion
and nationalism. In my study I will use
these other approaches to answer my research question.
*In
some cases religion helps explain things about nationalism. As Anthony Smith
argues; religious motives, narratives and
symbols may be transmitted into the political domain and may be used to construct
the nationalist claims.( Brubaker, 2012, 5-8) In other words; religion can contribute
to the devolopment of nationalism through the political appropriation of
religious symbols and narratives.
Nationalist
claims are also sometimes formulated in paralel with religious claims. The
motif of chosen-ness; ‘’myth of ethnic election’’is
given as an example to this situation by Smith. Nationalism may assume a
religious quality, taking over some of the forms and functions of religion. Similarly,
religion can accommodate the claims of nation-state and religious movements can
deploy nationalist language. From this point of view we can say that nationalist
politics and national consciouness may emerge in a period of intensified,
rather than declining, religiosity and they can emerge as an unintended consequence
of religious devolopments.
*Also in some cases religion can be part of
the nationalism rather than an external explanation of it. In these cases religion
becomes deeply imbricated or intertwined with nationalism and it supplies myths,
metaphors that are central to the discursive or iconic representation of the nation.
In other words religious resources help to answer the questions of ‘’who are we’’,
‘what is distinctive about us in terms of history, character, identity,
mission, or destiny?’’. Sometimes religious language and imagery are used to frame
talk about the special character, mission or destiny of a nation. Also the ‘nationalization’or
‘politicisation’ of religion in its organizational and practical as well as
discursive aspects promotes to the symbiosis of religious and national traditions.
*Also; there is a claim that there is a
distinctively religious type of nationalism that represents a distinct alternative
to secular nationalism: religious nationalism. In this type the focus is on the
distinctively religious content of programmes for ordering and regulating of
public and private life rather than on religious inflection of political rhetoric
that I’ve mentioned above.
Brubaker,
Rogers, ReligionandNationalism: FourApproaches, Nations and
Nationalism,18(1),2012,2-20
In some ways religion helps explain nationalism’s origin, its
power or its distinctive character. Benedict
Anderson evaluates ‘nation’ as the continuation of ‘religious community’. (Anderson, 2006, 9-37) Religion has
played an important role in formation of nationalism as an ideology. Hobsbawm
states that religion can be used as the proto-nationalism or as the antecedent
of nationalism. Because during nation building processes it can be used as a
tool to unite people together and to mobilize them. (Hobsbawm,1993, 89)
* In a similar way nationalism and nation building processes has determined the modern and social
formation of religion. During nation building processes religion has been
ideologised and religion transformed into a world view and an ideology. Nationalist ideology does not extinguish
religious envision, rather nationalism maintains religion by transforming and nationalizing it. We can define this situation as ‘the
secularization of the sacred’.
*Some scholars like Elias defines nationalism as a ‘secular belief system’. Nationalism with its own religious rituals,
myths, symbols, its speculative theology or mythology, pilgrimages, holy days,
patriotic heroes, sacred places and its supreme sacrifice is defined as a religion by
Calton Hayes.(Hayes, 1995) Anthony Smith also defines nationalism as ‘the new
religion of the people’.(Smith, 2003) We can interpret this as the religious
matrix of the category of the secular itself.
In his book Tanıl Bora states that we should not think
nationalism only as a modernization ideology. Because even though nationalism
shares some common senses with modernity; it also shows very important
similarities with religion. Elias defines nationalism as ‘the birth of a new
mystic’ and as a ‘new sense of community’ that substitutes the sense of
religious community. (Bora, 2009, 97-104)Nationalism meets the need of
spirituality by sacralizing the nation. From this point of view. Bora evaluates
nationalism and religion together as reactions against modernity and
universalist - secular asimilation.
In his books Bora explains how religion and nationalism are
combined. He mentions about a paradox between these two. (Bora, 2009, 99-104) Even
though religion contributes to nationalism in many ways, it impedes
nationalism’s modernization mission. In a historical context where these
ideologies are rival to each other, especially during nation building
processes, this paradox constitute major problems. ‘Nationalizing religion’ and
‘religionizing nationalism’ are the ideal typical solutions to this paradox. Through
these ways religion and nationalism are combined. Bora explains the occurrence
of Conservatism within this framework. We can say that Conservatism played an
combining role between thse two. Because this ideology doesn not see
nationalism and nation states as results of modernity or as contradictory with
religion. Conservatism believed that the aim of building a social order which is
eroded by modernization and enlightenment can be realized through nation
states. (Bora,2017,357) Conservatives believe that modernization destroyes
national and cultural codes of society and it resists modernization’s negative
effects through nationalism.
Main Argument: This theoretical approaches that explain the
multiple connections and affinities between religion and nationalism are useful
to explain the relationship between Islamism and nationalism in the context of current
Turkish politics. To interpret the current Ak Party – MHP alliance in th
ideological level; rather than thinking nationalism,
conservatism and Islamism as different and totally contested political and
ideological positions; we should think them as deeply imbricated and
intertwined with each other. Bora, does not think nationalism,
conservatism and Islamism as the ideological elements or components of
right-wing politics in Turkey. According to him they do not express fixed
positions anymore. Rather he thinks them as the ‘states’ of Turkish political
right. He uses the analogy of ‘states of matter’ to show their interconverting
quality and to explain the transitivity among them. He thinks nationalism as
the grammer, Islamism as the vocabulary and conservatism as the tone or mode or
style of Turkish political right. (Bora, 2009, 7-12) In the next part of the article to test the
Bora’s hypotheses and other theories that I have presented above; I will discuss
the relationships and transitivities among these two positions throughout
history.
ISLAMISM AND
NATIONALISM IN TURKEY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
If we look at the current devolopments from the aspect of
ideological trends throughout the history, we see that there are strong roots
of this new trend in political ideology
that stretch back a long way. If we look at the movements of political thought
in the late Ottoman Empire; we see that there were tides, transitions and indefinities
between Islamism and Turkish nationalism. They were intertwined in the levels
of programmes, targets, arguments and symbols. The ideological trends of this
term clearly shows the transitivity between Islamism and nationalism. Efforts
for nation building and rejuvenation of religion continued simultaneously. To
recover state and religion, Ottoman intellectuals were inclined to accept a
nationalism whose subject is determined by religion. They have started to see
Muslim community as a modern nation. An effort to make all Muslims a part of a
nation had started. From this point of view some Turkish intellectuals argue
that we can think Islam as the proto-nationalism or as the antecedent of nationalism
in a similar way with Hobsbawm. Because Islam gave inspiration to Turkish
nationalism.
Early on; the term ‘nation’ was used with its Islamic meaning
and meant religious community. Islam rather than ethnicity was seen as the main
constituent element of society. Islamists opposed to ethnic nationalism and
named it as ‘kavmiyetçilik’, and they defended ‘nation of Islam’ as the ‘true
nationalism’. Later on a distinction between ‘pure Turkish nationalist’ and ‘Turkish-Islamists’
came into existence. Turkish-Islamists saw religion as the irreplaceable element
of the nation and they defend a nationalism which is defined by religion.
In the Constitutional Era Islamist’s use of national discourses
reached to a higher level. During Abdülhamit era the emphasis on the concepts
of ‘’vatan/millet’’ and the politics of Pan-Islam showed the fluidity from
Islamism to Nationalism.
During the transition term from Empire to Republic; intellectuals
tried to overcome the tension between religion and nationalism through defining
the Islam as one of the primary component of nationhood. What they were trying
to do was actually turning Islam into a national religion. As I explained in
the theory part nationalist ideology does
not extinguish religious envision, rather nationalism maintains religion by
transforming it. Modernist
Muslim thinkers were trying to functionalize religion for the modernization and
nationalization processes by proving the coherence between Islam and modern
values. According to Bora; Turkish nationalist thinkers were in complience with
Modernist Muslim thinkers. Because they needed the social and culturel power of
Islam for their aims. This situation shows, as I explained in the theory part,
the importance of religion in formation of nationalism as an ideology.
We can see the effects of
Islamic nationalism also during the National Struggle. Islamic identity
played an important role during these years and Muslims were mobilized against
unbelievers. Turkish national poet Mehmet Akif
Ersoy’s sermons, poems and the Turkish National Anthem also shows this
strong relationship. These poems shows how Islam and nationalism were used at
the same time to legitimaze the struggle in the eyes of the people. Also in the
National Pact, and in the Treaty of Lausanne administration gave place to Islam as an identity. However according to
Bora; tides, transitions and indefinities between Islamism and Turkish
nationalism were still continuing during the National Struggle and in the
upcoming years of Republic religion was not counted as a fundamental element of
new national identitiy.
Citizenship and legal and political bonds were put forward and
the other elements of identity such as religion and ethnicity were excluded.
However during 1930s ethnicity has been put forward and religion became an
auxiliary element of national identity.
On the other hand; the Republic of Turkey has not totaly
excluded religion. Kemalists and modernists did not see religion as a
anachronism which is embeddes in history; rather they see it as an phenomenon
which needs to be modernized. Because of nationalization was thought as the
basis of modernization, the main purpose was nationalizing the Islam.
Translating Qur’an and Ezan into Turkish were the results of this project. The
efforts to purify Islam from the effects of Arab and Persian effect was one of the
other implementations of the project of building a modern national religion. In
a similar understanding, there were some interpretations that see Turkish
nation as the most distinguished and dominant nation of Muslim world in the
Republican Turkey. This understanding that see Turkey as the model and leader
of Muslim World shows continuity with the era of caliphate, and still continues
in our day. Even some scholars like Nihal Atsız claimed that Islam has stayed
alive and improved thanks to Turks. These interpretations played an important
role for the formation of nationalist-conservative discourse at the end of
1940s.
As I have mentioned in the theory part one of the ways of
analysing the relationship between religion and nationalism is treating them as
analogous phenomena. There are some scholars that define nationalism as ‘the
new religion of the people’. This definition is applicable for the Republican
ideology. Through nationalism the sacred was secularized. The official
nationalist discourse used religious symbols a lot. For example the concept of
martyrdom was redefined as ‘to die for religion, country and nation’’.
Comparing Nutuk with Qur’an, descriptions of Atatürk as a
godlike person, teaching Ataturkism as a religion; all of them were the
indicators that shows the transfer of holiness from religion to national state.
However Republic was not totally successful in creating a
social ethos. As from the end of the
1930s; the understanding that sees religion as one of the primary components of
national identity started o gain strenght at the political and ideologial
level. Turkish nationalists came gradually close to a religious nationalism. From
1960s to 1990s Turkish nationalists came close to a religious nationalism
gradually and at the end nationalist- conservative sensibilities became
established in the grassroots of MHP. This orientation from a secular and
ethnic nationalist line to conservative nationalist line made MHP closer and
acceptable for Islamists. In a parallel way; Islamism also headed toward
nationalism by the efforts of Turkish Islamists like Şemsettin Günaltay and
Eşref Edip. One of the other intellectuals that contributed to the formation of
a nationalist-conservative discourse was Necip Fazıl.
As results of these devolopments the conservative Islamists
and Turkish ethnic and secular nationalists came to a mutual understanding and
formed the nationalist-conservative line. During this term religious and national values
united. This association gained strenght especially during 1950s and 1960s, and
religion, state and nation merged with one another and became an indivisible
whole. This new nationalist-conservative line determined the ideological
coordinates of Turkish political right and this line attached to the official
ideology over time. During 1980s religion was attached to official ideology in
the highest level. In other words nationalism and Islamism lost their
autonomies and melted in the state.
3Bora,
Tanıl, 2009, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilk, Muhafazakarlık,
İslamcılık,İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları,pp:112-130
In short Turkish nationalists orientation from a secular and
ethnic nationalist line to a conservative nationalist line and Islamism’s
orientation toward a religious nationalism made them closer and acceptable for
each other. We can see this rapprochement’s
reflections also in the political life. During this term the transitivities
between MSP-RP’s and MÇP’s lines increased and they made an electoral alliance
in 1991 elections. I think this term shows some similarities with today’s
Turkish political life. The references which is given by AKP’s and MHP’s
politicians to the alliance in 1991 proves this argument. In that term MHP’s orientation from a secular and ethnic
nationalist line to a conservative nationalist line made MHP acceptable for MSP-RP.
AK PARTY ERA
In
recent years nationalist politics and national consciouness emerged at the same
time with a period of intensified religiosity. As
a result of this, in today’s Turkey, the
frontiers among nationalist and Islamist and conservative positions became
heavily indistinct. They are deeply
imbricated and intertwined with each other. İdeologies
and ideas reached to a high level of flexibility. Depending on the state of play, on the need and on the
circumstances, all manner of material can be pressed into service. As Anthony
Smith argues ; religious motives, narratives and symbols may be
transmitted into the political domain and may be used to construct the
nationalist claims. In parallel with this argument AKP utilizes religious texts, symbols and traditions, however at the
same time it utilizes the familiar discourse of nationalism.
As against official, main stream Turkish nationalism which is
highly intertwined with Kemalism; Ak Party devoloped a new nationalism
discourse. Ak Party based its understanding of nationalism to the distinction
between good(müsbet) and bad(menfi) nationalism which is previously put forward
by Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursi. To define ‘good nationalism’ Ak Party mainly used
Islamic terminology and used Islam as a base to define nation. For example
during peace process the proposal of a ‘common Muslim identity’ was presented
as a solution to Kurdish issue. In other words; Ak party rejected a nationalism
which is based on racism and slogans. It prioritized Muslim
identity over ethnic identity and holded a more universalist-Islamic
perspective. (Bora, 2017, 241-268)
Ak Party’s nationalism has also a liberal aspect. Until
mid-way of 2010s a devolopmentalist and civilizationist nationalist discourse
have been mainly used. They associated national pride with the economic success ,performance of devolopment and welfare. It rejected a
micro defensive and inward-looking
Turkish nationalism. Instead, Muslim nationalists imagine Turkey to be a
major world power, guided by an assertive and ambitious foreign policy that
rests on building Turkey’s soft power and economic strength. According to this new liberal nationalist discourse
which is bring along by the effects of globalization; rather than spending
Turkey’s energy fighting with ‘ internal enemies’, Turkey should have used its
energy to build a strong national economy, to gain scientific, technologic and
economic successes. In short; Ak Party combined a new economist and liberal
nationalism with an Islamic nationalism.
(Bora, 2017, 241-268)
However a lot of scholars argues that after mid-way of 2010s
Ak Party’s understanding of nationalism underwent a transformation. During this
proces the transitivities between Ak Party’s ‘liberal-conservative
nationalism’, official Turkish nationalism and idealist and Turkish nationalism
has increased and different aspects of nationalism has became intertwined. The
various nationalist discourses in Turkey is today increasingly uniting. As a
result of this transformation in its current politics we see a strong dose of
Turkish nationalism and an ethno-cultural understanding of
Turkishness beside Islamic nationalism. There is
the emergence of both Islamist and Turkish nationalist expressions.
There is a Neo-Ottoman
rhetoric that is seen as‘adjunctive’ to Islamism but with which we cannot
simply equate it and we can not explain it with ignoring the newly emerging
nationalist trend. Among many Turkish religious conservatives the feeling that
Turkey was the standard-bearer of Islamic civilization and should
play a leadership role, particularly in the Muslim world revived again in recent years. This Neo-Ottoman
rhetoric, religious and nationalist discourses are frequently used by
politicians and are presented by other means of media through TV series etc.Portraying of Erdoğan as a descendant of a well-regarded
Ottoman-era sultan and celebrations of the
conquest of Istanbul can
be shown as a example to this newly Islamic nationalist line.
Within the ideology that shapes this alliance the style and air
of Turkish nationalism and certain of its ritual elements that the MHP
represents plays an important role. However we can still observe a similar
paradox, that I mention in the theory part, between Ak Party’s Islamism and
MHP’s nationalism. A nationalism that is compatible with that of the MHP is
included within the ideology that shapes this ruling body. To overcome this
paradox the ruling body refashions it. So we can say that this alliance came
about in conjunction with that ideological supplementation. (Bora , 2017)
Through the ways of ‘Nationalizing Islam’ and ‘Islamizing nationalism’
two sides try to overcome this paradox. One aspect of this strategy is to
‘Islamize Atatürk’, a tendency that has been observable for some time. Atatürk is reframed and his meaning
more or less totally transformed. Within the Islamist-nationalist discourse,
Atatürk is consistently referred to as the gazi, the Islamic warrior hero, who secured Turkish national
independence, while his central role as the main protagonist of a radical and
secularist modernization project is duly ignored.(Alaranta, 2016)
When
the AKP was founded, the party rejected the Kemalist national historical
narrative, but alsorejected the Islamic-conservative national narrative
promoted by the Islamist National Outlook movement from which the
AKP sprang. Because AKP represented a liberal,
pro-Western stance and opposed to these two nationalist narratives. (Alaranta,
2016) Ak Party founded as a democratic, conservative, nonconfessional movement. Its political ideology has been
mainly defined by the term
‘conservative democratic’ and unlike its predecessors, the AKP did not
centre its image around an Islamic identity or around an nationalist identity;
indeed, its leaders underscored that it was not an Islamist or a nationalist
party and emphasized that its focus was on democratization.
However,
Today, the AKP is re-embracing the Islamic-conservative national narrative,
while appropriating a redefined version of the Kemalist national historical
narrative. Anti-Westernism is the most important factor that uniting these
various nationalist discourses in Turkey. AKP tries to consolidate a common,
anti-Western ideological narrative by combining the different nationalist
discourses; Islamic-conservative, Kemalist, far right nationalist and leftist
nationalist to legitimate and uphold its power. (Alaranta, 2016)
CONCLUSION
In recent years we can observe the
nationalism’s recourse to Islamism, and Turkish conservatism. Islamism and Turkish nationalism do not express fixed
positions anymore and there is a transitivity between them thanks to their
common roots in history. It is possible to explain this new trend in political
ideology with Tanıl Bora’s analogy of ‘states of matter’. Islamism is without
doubt a very powerful factor and constitutes the frame o Ak Party’s politics,
but an important characteristic of this ideological configuration is that its
content and motifs can be pretty fluid and can easily transform into
nationalist domain.
The historical background is also effective to explain how
these ideologies can become deeply imbricated and intertwined
with each other. Because we can find the roots
of this ideological combination in the history. There is a joint umbrella defined as being nationalist-conservative
that stretches right back to the 1940’s and 1950’s. In fact, this is an
umbrella that has never been fully closed. Within Islamism, there has been a
tendency since the 70’s to depart from that umbrella, and that tendency has
developed considerable momentum. Now, it is being reopened to assume tent-like
dimensions. (Bora,2017)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brubaker,
Rogers, 2012 Religionand Nationalism: FourApproaches, Nations and
Nationalism,18(1) ,2-20
Anderson,
Benedict, 2006, Imagined Communities, Verso,
Hobsbawm,
E.J. 1993,Milletler ve Milliyetçilik, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları,
Hayes, Carlton J.H.,1994 Milliyetçilk: Bir
Din, İstanbul: İzi
Smith,
A.D., 2003. Chosen Peoples, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Bora,
Tanıl, 2009, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilk, Muhafazakarlık,
İslamcılık,İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları
Bora,
Tanıl, 2017, Cereyanlar;Türkiye’de Siyasi İdeolojiler , İstanbul: İletişim
Yayınları
Bora,
Tanıl, 2017, Erdoğanism is on the rise,
Alaranta,
Toni, 2016, Turkish Islamism and Nationalism Before and after the Failed Coup Attempt,
The Turkey Analyst
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